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We  are  all  familiar  with  the  folksy  wisdom  expressed  in  the  saying,
"If  it isn't broken,  don't  fix it."  The experience of the past twenty  years,
when  far-reaching  changes  were  made  in the  family  law  of  nearly  every
American  state  at  the  same  time  that  American  family  behavior  was
undergoing  rapid  and  profound  changes,  suggests  a  corollary  or  two  to
this  saying:  "Don't  fix  it  until  you  know  what's  wrong  with  it,"  or,
"Don't  fix it  while  it is right in the middle of falling apart."  It  is beginn-
ing to seem that  the  1960's  and  1970's-when  divorce rates  and women's
and  mothers'  labor  force  participation  rates  were  increasing  at  un-
precedented  speed,  when  the female-headed,  single-parent  family  became
the  fastest-growing  family  type  in  the United  States,  and  when  informal
cohabitation  approached  Scandinavian  proportions-were  not  ideal  times
for  sober  and  reflective  law reform  efforts.  Whether  or not the time was
right,  however,  there  was  more  activity  in American  family  law  in  that
twenty-year  period than  there  had  been  in the  preceding  hundred  years.
In view of the more or  less continuous  upheaval  in patterns of family
behavior during  the  past twenty years,  a  reasonable  reaction  to the  fore-
going observations  would be  to ask  whether  we have  any grounds to sup-
pose  there will  ever  be  a time  when  family  law reform  can  proceed  under
better  conditions.  According  to  recent  data  from  the United  States  Cen-
sus  Bureau,  the  answer  seems  to  be  yes,  and  that  time  is  the  present.
The  reason  is that  many  of  the trends  of  the  1960's  and  1970's  appear
to  have  peaked  and  levelled  off.
In  a  statement  made  in  1979  before  the  United  States  House  of
Representatives  Select  Committee  on  Population,  Census  Bureau
Demographer  Paul  Glick stated  that  the United  States  seems  to be  enter-
ing  a  period of relative  stability  in  family  behavior.'  He pointed  out  that
changes  in  family  life  are  strongly  related  to  changes  in  the  birth  rate,
to  the  school  and  college  enrollment  rates,  and  to  women's  labor  force
participation  rates.  The  birth  rate,  he  noted,  has  declined  about  as  far
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as  it  can  go,  with  the  average  family  expecting  to  have  no  more  than
two  children.2  The  great  increase  in  high  school  and  college  enrollment
in  the  1960's  and  1970's  has  also  levelled  off.3  As  for  women's  labor
force  participation  (which  jumped  from  thirty-eight  percent  in  1960  to
fifty-two  percent  in  1980,  and  increased  even  more  dramatically  for
mothers  of pre-school  and  school-age  children),
4  Glick  said  that  "the  odds
seem  to  favor  a  slackening  of  the  rate  of  increase  . . . over  the  next
decade  or two." 5  The  divorce  rate,  that potent  generator  of  legal issues,
more  than  doubled  between  1963  and  1975,  but  has  fluctuated  little and
even  declined  slightly  in  the  past  few  years.6  Glick  concluded  his  1979
report  by  predicting  that  "most  of  the  changes  in  family  life  over  the
next  two  decades  will  be  small  as  compared  with  those  during  the  last
two  decades."'
If Glick's  prediction  is  correct,  we are  presently  in  a  better  position
than  we  have  been in  for  many years  to  take  stock of our  situation  and
to try to  determine  what  kinds  of legal  measures  will  be  appropriate  for
the  current  needs  and  desires  of American  families.  It  follows,  too,  that
states  like  Louisiana  that  did  not jump  hastily on the  family  law  reform
bandwagon  now  have the  opportunity  to  attack  the  most  pressing  prob-
lems  in  the  area  in  a  more  calm  and  rational  way  than  some  of  their
sister  states.  Indeed,  the writer  will  go further,  in the  case  of Louisiana,
to  suggest  that,  now  that  the  dust  is  beginning  to  settle,  certain  institu-
tions  of the civil  law  which  at  various  times during  the past twenty years
may  have  seemed  outmoded  to some  observers,  now reveal  great  promise
for  approaching  some  of the  most  challenging  contemporary  family  law
problems.
But  let  us not minimize  the  difficulties.  Even  though  the demographic
data indicate  that changes  in American  family behavior  in  the near future
will not  be  so rapid  or  profound  as  they  were  in the  1960's  and  1970's,
the data  also  plainly  tell us that  there  is  no going  back  to the way  things
were.  The  cyclone  may  have  passed,  but  the  landscape  has  changed  ir-
revocably.  Thus,  before  turning  to  specific  issues  of  family  law  reform
for  the  1980's,  it  might  be  well  for  us  to  remind  ourselves  of  some  of
the principal  features of our current and  foreseeable  situation.  Again,  the
writer  is  relying,  not  on  the  wild  speculations  of  futurologists,  but  on
prosaic  documents  issued by  the United  States  Government Printing  Office.
Nearly  half  of  all  marriages  now  being  formed  are  expected  to  end  in
2.  Id.,  at  1.
3.  Id.
4.  S.  Bianchi & D.  Spain,  American  Women:  Three  Decades  of Change  1, 15-18  (Bureau
of  the  Census,  U.S.  Dep't  of  Commerce  Aug.  1983).
5.  Glick,  supra  note  1,  at  1.
6.  S.  Bianchi  &  D.  Spain,  supra  note  4,  at  3;  Glick,  supra  note  1,  at  2-3.
7.  Id.  at  5.
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divorce,'  and  about sixty percent  of all divorces  now  involve couples  with
young  children, 9  a  figure  that  can  be  expected  to  decline  slightly  as  the
population  ages.  After divorce,  about ninety percent of these children  re-
main  in  their mother's  custody,  a figure  that  has not  changed  much since
1960'"  despite  twenty  years  of  sex-neutral  laws,  a  great  deal  of
"consciousness-raising,"  and  the impression  created  by films  like Kramer
v.  Kramer. It is estimated  that  nearly half-four  of ten-of all  American
children  will spend a  significant  part of their  childhood in  a  single-parent
family  before  reaching  age  eighteen."  In  1982,  twenty-two  percent  of all
children  under  eighteen  were  in such  families.' 2  The financial  circumstances
of  female-headed  households  are  precarious.  The  mothers'  standards  of
living  typically  fall  precipitously  after  divorce,  even  though  their  labor
force  participation  rates  go  up.' 3  Many  fall  below  the poverty  level.  In-
deed,  the poverty  population  has  become  largely  a population  of women
and  children.'"
The unprecedented  nature of many of the phenomena  facing the  family
law  reformer  today  means  that  we  cannot  simply  plug  in  legal  devices
which  worked  well  in an earlier time and  under different  conditions.  Law
reform  in  the  1980's  will  require  us  to  muster  all  our  collective  imagina-
tion,  intelligence,  expertise,  good  will,  and  concern  for  our  fellow  men,
women,  and-especially-children.  On  the  occasion  of  this  Family  Law
Colloquium,  the  writer  would  like  to  discuss  three  specific  areas  where
law  reform  has  become  necessary  because  of  changed  social  and
demographic  conditions,  and  where  the common-law  states  have,  in  the
writer's  view,  something to learn  from the  approach of the civil  law.  These
are the areas  of reallocation  of family  property upon  divorce,  private order-
ing of marital  property relations  through  contract,  and protection  of family
members  against  disinheritance.
REALLOCATION  OF  FAMILY  PROPERTY  UPON  DIVORCE
Of  these  three  areas  the  one  in  which  recent  legal  change  has  been
8.  S.  Bianchi  &  D.  Spain,  supra  note  4,  at  3.
9.  Divorce,  Child  Custody,  and  Child  Support,  in  Bureau  of the  Census,  U.S.  Dep't
of  Commerce,  Current  Population  Reports:  Special  Studies  8  (series  P-23,  no.  84  1979)
[hereinafter  cited  as  Divorce].
10.  Glick,  supra  note  1, at  2-3.
II.  Divorce,  supra  note  9,  at  3.
12.  Marital  Status  and  Living  Arrangements:  March  1982,  in  Bureau  of the  Census,
U.S.  Dep't  of  Commerce,  Current  Population  Reports  5  (series  P-20,  no.  380  1983).
13.  Grossman,  Divorced  and  Separated  Wumen  in  the  Labor  Force-An  Update,  101
Monthly  Lab.  Rev.  43,  43  (Oct.  1978);  Weitzman,  The  Economics  of Divorce:  Social  and
Economic  Consequences  of Property,  Alimony  and  Child  Support  Awards,  28  UCLA  L.
Rev.  1181,  1265-66  (1981).  See  generally  C.  Adams  & D.  Cooper,  A  Guide  for  Judges  in
Child  Support  Enforcement  1-9  (1982);  U.S.  Comm'n  on  Civil  Rights,  A  Growing  Crisis:
Disadvantaged  Women  and  Their  Children  (1983).
14.  Divorce,  supra  note  9,  at  1-2.
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most  dramatic  is  that  of property  division  upon  divorce.  In  barely  ten
years,  following  the example  of  the  Uniform  Marriage  and  Divorce  Act
(U.M.D.A.)  as amended  in  1973,"  nearly  all  American  separate  and com-
munity  property  states  have  abandoned  their  systems  of  fixed  rules  for
determining  how  property  should  be allocated  after divorce  and have gone
over  to  variants  of  systems  which  give  the  courts  substantial  discretion
to disregard  legal  title (or the distinction between  community  and separate
property)  and  to  redistribute  the  spouses'  property  in  the  manner  that
the judge  considers  fair.' 6  Usually,  but  not always,  the judge  is  provided
with  a  set of statutory  guidelines  for the exercise  of such discretion.  These
schemes,  which  were  presented  to  state  legislatures  under  the  name
"equitable  distribution,"  are  more  properly called  discretionary  distribu-
tion,  since  what  consistently  distinguishes  them  from  their  predecessors
is not that they are  more equitable,  but that  they are  more unpredictable.
These  statutes,  adopted  in  haste,  are  now  giving  the  states  that adopted
them  the  opportunity  to  repent  at  leisure.
In  the  first  place,  the  system  of  discretionary  distribution,  because
of inconsistency  in results  among apparently  similar  cases,  is widely  per-
ceived  as  unfair  by  litigants.  Second,  this  unpredictability  of  outcome
means  the law in  this area is  not serving  one  of its  most important purposes:
to  furnish a basis  for negotiation  and  future  planning  by the parties.  This
is  especially  important  in  view  of  the  fact  that  over  ninety  percent  of
divorce cases  are  settled  by agreement.  Third,  these laws  and their  guide-
lines  offer  the opportunity  for,  and  even  encourage,  abuse  of the  litiga-
tion  and  negotiation  processes  more  than  do  systems  of  fixed  rules.
Fourth,  it  is  seriously  open  to  question  whether  consensus  supports,  or
any  rational  policy is  served  by,  a  view of marriage  in  itself as engaging
all  one's property  no  matter  when  or how  acquired,  when it  is  estimated
that  nearly  one marriage  in two  will  end in divorce,  many  of them within
the first  few years.  Fifth,  discretionary  distribution  has been  accompanied
by  developments  in  the  law  governing  marriage  contracts  that  make  it
extremely  difficult  for lawyers  to assure persons  who  have legitimate desires
to  contract  out  of the system  that  they can  avoid  its  operation.  In  sum,
the  existing  law  in  most  states  throws  divorcing  spouses-and  their
children-into  a  lottery  whose  outcome  greatly  depends  on  the  luck  of
the judicial  draw  and  the competence  of counsel,  and  in  which  the  only
sure  winners  are  the  lawyers.
The remedy  for  all these  defects of discretionary  distribution,  however,
is not  simply  to  go back  to  the  predecessor  systems  of separate  property
15.  Unif.  Marriage  & Divorce  Act  § 307,  alternative  A,  9A  U.L.A.  142-43  (1973)
[hereinafter  cited  as  U.M.D.A.].
16.  For  a  discussion  of  this  process  and  a description  of the  statutes,  see  generally
M.  Glendon,  The  New  Family  and  the  New  Property  57-68  (1981).
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and  community  of acquests.  One  reason  for  the widespread  adoption  of
discretionary  distribution  was  that those older  systems  were not function-
ing  well in the  new world  of no-fault divorce,  which  removed  the leverage
an economically  weaker  spouse  usually  had  in  bargaining  with  a  partner
who  wished  to terminate the  marriage.  The separate  property  systems were
perceived  as  unfair,  especially  to  women  who  had  stayed  home  to  raise
children  and  who  had  no  income  or  property  of  their  own.  Traditional
community  property  systems  had  the defect that  a  flat,  equal  division  of
acquests often  requires the  sale and division  of the proceeds  of the  family's
only  substantial  asset,  the  marital  home,  with  resulting  hardship  to  the
children  and  the  custodial  spouse.17
In  the writer's  view,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  apparent  that  there
is  no satisfactory  way  of handling  the  economic  aspects  of modern  divorce
within  the  conventional  framework  of matrimonial  property  and  family
support law.  Is  there  some other  way  to cut through  these problems?  The
writer  believes  there  is.  It  makes  sense  to  begin,  not  with  some  vague
notion of partnership,  but by looking at the features  which the statistical-
ly most  frequently-occurring  types  of  divorce  have in common.  At once,
three facts stand out:  (1) Most divorces  (about sixty percent)  involve minor
children; 8  (2)  most divorces  involve  marriages of relatively  short duration;' 9
and  (3)  the property  of  most  divorcing  couples,  especially  in  these  two
categories,  includes  few  assets  besides  the  marital  home  and  household
goods,  the earning power  of the spouses,  and,  in the case of middle-aged
persons,  their  pension  rights. 2 0  Further,  it  seems  probable  (1) that  there
is  a  fairly  substantial  consensus  in our  society  on  several  aspects  of how
these  facts  (and their  various  permutations  and  combinations)  should  be
treated  in divorce;  (2) that  this  consensus is  already being  reflected,  albeit
somewhat  haphazardly,  in the behavior  of the courts; and  (3) that if these
suppositions  are  correct,  certain  changes  in the  law are  both  feasible  and
indicated  in  the  1980's.
Almost  everyone in  Western  countries  would  agree that,  in principle,
the  basic  rules  of matrimonial  property  law,  like  those  of  intestate  suc-
cession  law,  should  be framed  with the  needs  and  desires of the majority
of  people  who  will  potentially  be  affected  by  them  in  mind.  From  this
point  of view,  however,  the  main  problem  with  existing  marital  property
and  support  law  in most American  states  is that  it  contemplates,  not  the
typical  case  or cases,  but a  special  case.  That special  case,  as exemplified
by  the  U.M.D.A.,  is  that  in  which  sufficient  property  exists  to  permit
17.  For  a recent  critical  examination  of  the  equal-division  principle,  see  Fineman,
Implementing  Equality: Ideology,  Contradiction  and  Social Change,  1983  Wis.  L.  Rev.  789,
826-42.
18.  Divorce,  supra  note  9.
19.  Glick,  supra  note  1, at  2.
20.  M.  Glendon,  supra  note  16,  at  91-96.
19841 15578LOUISIANA  LA W REVIEW
a  clean  break  between  the spouses."' The principal  defect  shared  by most
existing  laws  and  the  major  law  reform  proposals  such  as  the  Uniform
Marriage  and  Divorce  Act  is that  their  basic  premises  are  inapplicable
to  nearly  three-fifths  of  all  divorces-those  that  involve  minor  children.
For  example,  U.M.D.A.'s  principle  that  there  should  be no  maintenance
to  a  former  spouse  unless  special  needs  exist22  must  be applied  by courts
in  a  world  where  the  majority  of cases  involve  a  custodial spouse  who,
for that  reason  alone,  does have  special  needs.  To  be  sure,  the  fact  that
a spouse may be caring  for  young children  is mentioned  in the U.M.D.A.
guidelines  on need,2  but  why make  the prevailing  situation  the  exception
rather than  the starting  point?  The  rehabilitation  principle,  which  would
limit  maintenance  to  the  short  period  necessary  to  make  the  formerly
dependent  spouse  self-supporting,  is even  less  suited  to  the  situation  of
the custodian  of  young  children  who  typically  will  not  be  able  to  com-
bine  child  care  with  highly  remunerative  market  work.  In  sum,  the  idea
of effecting  a  clean  break  by dividing  property  between  the  spouses  and
excluding  maintenance  after divorce  does  not come  to grips  with  the  fact
that  no legal  system  has  been  able to  achieve  this  result on  a  widespread
basis  because,  in  most  divorce  cases,  children  are  present  and  there  is
insufficient  property.  All  these  reform  models  are  examples  of Thomas
Reed  Powell's  famous  definition  of the legal  mind  as  the  mind  that  can
think of something that is inextricably  connected to  something else without
thinking  of  what  it  is connected  to.
In  1980,  the  English  Law  Commission  said  with  respect  to  divorce
suits  that  involve  minor  children:
In  such  cases  it  may  well  be  thought  the  primary  concern  must
be  for  a  broken  family  rather  than  a  broken  marriage;  and  the
welfare  of the  children,  social,  psychological  and economic,  should
take precedence  over the adjustment  of financial  rights  and duties
of  former  spouses  toward  each  other.
4
21.  The  prefatory  note  to the  U.M.D.A.  states:  "[Biecause  of  its  property  division
provisions,  the Act  does  not  continue  the traditional  reliance  upon  maintenance  as  the primary
means  of  support  for  divorced  spouses."  U.M.D.A.,  commissioners'  prefatory  note,  9A
U.L.A.  93  (1973).  The  comment  to  U.M.D.A.  §  308  on  maintenance  states:
The  dual  intention  of  this  section  and  Section  307  (property  division)  is  to  en-
courage  the court  to provide  for  the  financial  needs  of the  spouses  by  property
disposition  rather  than by  an award  of maintenance.  Only  if the available  proper-
ty is  insufficient  for the purpose  and if the spouse who  seeks  maintenance  is  unable
to  secure employment  appropriate  to  his  skills  and  interests  or  is  occupied  with
child  care  may  an  award  of maintenance  be  ordered.
Id.  at  160-61.
22.  Id.  §  308  &  comment,  at  160-61.
23.  Id.  §  308(a)(2),  at  160.
24.  The  Law  Commission,  The  Financial  Consequences  of Divorce:  The  Basic  Policy
103,  English  L.  Comm'n  Rep.  3-4  (1980).
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Here  we  have  a  new  and  appropriate  starting  point  for  thinking  about
property  division  on  divorce,  which  we may  call  the  "children-first  prin-
ciple."  This  principle  rests  on  a  notion that  most  people  in  our  society
probably would  accept:  the fact  of having  children  impresses  a  lien upon
all of the parents'  income and property  to the extent necessary  to provide
for  the  children's  decent  subsistence  at  least  until  those  children  reach
the  age  of majority.  Unlike  the  conflicting  and  competing  principles  on
the  rights  of  the spouses in  current  marital  property  law,  this  principle
has  the  twin  virtues  that it  is  relatively  non-controversial  and  that  it  ap-
plies  to  the  majority  of  cases.
What  would  happen  if this  children-first  principle  were  explicitly  given
the highest  rank in  marital  property  law?  In the first place,  until the welfare
of the  child  or children  was  adequately  secured,  there would  be  no  such
thing  as  "marital"  property,  but  only  "family"  property.  This  would
reflect the economic  and sociological  reality  of the circumstances  of most
people  with  children.  In  fact,  it  would  not  alter  the  outcomes  of  cases
so much as  it would  sanction  and encourage  what most judges are already
trying  to  do within  the framework  of the discretionary  distribution  system
and  its  variants.  John  Eekelaar  of  Oxford  University  recently  examined
the reported  decisions  under the English version  of discretionary  distribu-
tion and  discovered  that  one major  principle  above  all  emerges  from the
English  case  law  on  post-divorce  financial  support,  though  it  is  nowhere
to  be  found  in  the  English  statutes.  This  principle  is  that  "[a]dequate
provision  must  be  made  to  ensure  the  support  and  accommodation  of
the  children  of  the  marriage." 25
A  parallel  case-law  development  appears  to  be  occurring  within  the
United  States.26  It  is  safe  to  say  that  in the  majority  of cases  involving
dependent  children,  the  best  possible  outcome  usually  will  be  no  more
than  the  piecing  together,  from  property  and  income  and  in-kind  per-
sonal  care,  of support  for  the  basic  needs  of  the  children.  One  way  or
another,  the  household  goods  and  matrimonial  home,  or  its  use  for  a
period  of time,  usually will  and should  be awarded  to the custodial  spouse.
The  fact  that  the  dwelling  and  household  goods  are  apt  to  be  the  only
significant  property  of  a young  couple  with growing  children  means  that
marital  property  law (as distinct  from support  law)  will often  have nothing
more  to  do  once the  question of the use  of the dwelling  (and accounting
or compensation,  if any,  for  such  use)  is  settled.  This explains  why  Max
Rheinstein  and  the  writer's  comparative  marital  property  survey  in  the
1970's  showed  a  marked  trend  toward the development  of a  special  legal
regime  for  such  property  within  marital  property  systems  all  over  the
25.  Eekelaar,  Some  Principles  of Financial  and  Property  Adjustment  on  Divorce,  95
Law  Q.  Rev.  253,  256  (1979).
26.  See  Annot.,  19  A.L.R.  4th  239  (1983).
19841 15590LOUISIANA  LA W REVIEW
Western  world.27  If there  is  other  property,  however,  the  children-first
principle  would  require  that  title  and  time  of  acquisition  be  disregarded
until the  welfare of the children and their  custodian is adequately  secured.
(Implicit  in  all  this  are  assumptions  that  child  support,  custody,  spousal
support and  property  division  cannot be  neatly separated  from  each  other
in practice and that,  in  child support,  the needs of minor children include
a  component  of  custodial  care.)
At this point  one  might  well  ask  why the children-first  principle  needs
to be explicitly  introduced  into existing  law if it  substantially  reflects  what
judges  are  already  doing.  At the simplest level,  the answer is that  predic-
tability  and  even-handedness  would  be  served  by  making  explicit  what
is implicit,  and  by making mandatory what  is now optional.  Beyond  this,
it  is  to  be  expected  that  giving  express  legal  primacy  to  the  welfare  of
children  would  improve  consumer  satisfaction  with  the system  by  basing
it  on  a  principle  that both  spouses  and  the public  in  general  can  under-
stand and  accept.  It  is  much  easier to  find  support for the idea that  child-
begetting  involves  lasting  economic  responsibility  and  engages  all  one's
economic  resources  to  the  extent  necessary,  than  that  marriage  does  so.
It  may  even  be  hoped  that  the  principle  will  have  a  salutary  effect  on
the attitudes of the spouses themselves-bringing  out  their better  natures,
as  it  were.  In  one  recent  English  study,  divorce  litigants  repeatedly
expressed  astonishment  at  how  little attention  was  paid to  their  children
in  the  divorce  process.28  The  litigants  thought  the  legal  system  had  it
backwards  by concentrating  on the dead  marriage rather  than  on the  living
children,  and  they  were  right-not  only  about  England  but  the  United
States  as  well.
Another benefit  to be  expected  from the children-first  principle  is that
it  will  bring  out  into  the  open  the  fact  that  childless  and  child-rearing
marriages  involve  different  social,  political  and  moral  issues  and  should
therefore  be  analyzed  separately.  Just  as  corporate  law  has  had  to
distinguish  between  publicly-held  and  close corporations,  and commercial
law  between  law  for  merchants'  dealings  among  themselves  and  law  for
their  dealings  with  consumers,  so  family  law  should now  distinguish  law
for  the  married  couple  from  law  for  the  family  with  children.  Finally
(and this point suggests  a corollary  to the principle),  if  it is accepted  that
there  is  a  high  social  interest  in  providing  the  best  possible  conditions
for  child-raising,  there  should be some  form of recognition  in  family prop-
erty  division  for  the  efforts  of  persons  who  have  devoted  a  substantial
part  of their  lives  to  child-raising,  even  if they  are  not  currently  custo-
27.  Rheinstein  & Glendon,  Interspousal  Relations,  in  4  Int'l  Encyclopedia  Comp.  L.
177  (A.  Chloros  ed.  1980);  see  also  Comment,  The  Marital  Home:  Equal  or  Equitable
Distribution?,  50  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  1089,  1114  (1983).
28.  Elston,  Fuller  &  Murch,  Judicial  Hearings  of  Undefended  Divorce  Petitions,  38
Mod.  L.  Rev.  609,  618-19,  632-33,  637,  640  (1975).
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dians  of minor  children.  Arguably,  this  should  be  so,  at  least  if  such  a
person  has thereby incurred  disadvantages  in the job market  or with  respect
to  retirement  income.
It  is  further  suggested that  it  is  probably  more  useful  to  look  at this
as  a  question  of population,  rather  than  of  marriage,  policy.  The  issue
is  whether  the  obligations  incurred  by  begetting  children  should  include
responsibilities  toward  a  spouse  who  has  suffered  detriment  by  perform-
ing  the  important  social  function  of  child-raising,  and,  more  broadly,
whether  we should try  to promote  the welfare  of future  citizens by making
child-raising  a  less  risky  career  than  it  is  at  present.  If the  children-first
principle  can  be  extended  to  buttress  a  spouse's  current  position  caused
by past as  well  as  present  child  care,  then  we can  count  among  the cases
that  would  be  covered  by  the  principle  not  only  the  sixty  percent  of
divorces  that  involve  minor  children,  but  the  undetermined,  yet  un-
doubtedly  large,  group of  divorces  involving  spouses  who  have  incurred
economic  disadvantages  through  raising  children  in  the  past.  This  gives
us  an  impressive  number  of cases  in  which  title  to,  and  time  of  acquisi-
tion  of, property  might be  disregarded  in  order  to further  important  and
widely  recognized  social  goals.  This  is  not to  say that  it  will  be  a  simple
matter  to  determine  what  the  form  and  modalities  of compensation  for
past  child-raising  activities  should  be,  or  how  the  needs  of  children  in
a broken  family  are to  be  meshed  with needs  of children  in  a  new  family
formed  by  the  former  provider.  Judicial  discretion  would  still  be  called
for  in  all  of  these  cases,  but  judges  would  be  left  in  no  doubt  about
the  primary  goal.
The children-first  principle  not  only marks  out  the right  direction  (if
not  the  precise  path)  in  the  cases  it  covers,  but  it  also  serves  to  bring
the  issues  in the remaining,  more  controversial,  cases  into sharper  focus.
The  cases  that  would  not  be  included  within  the  children-first  principle
are the following:  divorces  terminating childless  marriages;  divorces  where
there  is  property  left  over  after  the  principle  and  its  corollary  have  been
satisfied;  and cases  where  neither  parent has  incurred  economic  detriment
as  a  result  of  child-raising.  Within  the  framework  just  suggested,  these
would  be  the  true  "marital  property,"  as  distinct  from  "family  prop-
erty,"  cases.  These  are far  from  being  the most  frequently occurring  situa-
tions,  but  they  are  ones  which  have  excited  lively  controversy.
With  respect  to  these  true  marital  property  cases,  it  is  also  possible
to  identify  a  property  division  principle  which  is  more  likely  to  attract
consensus  under  modern  conditions than  any competing  position.  The prin-
ciple  is  one which  Max  Rheinstein,  Kevin  Gray and  the writer  have each
advocated,2 9  and  it  will  sound  familiar  to  Louisianians:  property  which
29.  M.  Glendon,  State,  Law and  Family:  Family Law  in Transition  in the  United  States
and  Western  Europe  267  (1977);  K.  Gray,  Reallocation  of  Property  on  Divorce  127-51,
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is  acquired  by  gainful  activity  during  the  marriage  should  be  divided
equally,  in  the absence  of  agreement  to  the  contrary.  This  old  principle
of the Spanish  community  of gains  has several  virtues  in the modern  con-
text:  (1) it avoids  the expense,  unpredictability  and vagaries  of discretionary
division;  (2)  it  is  a  neat  solution  to  the  problem  of  how  to  distinguish
short- and  long-term childless  marriages  because it  automatically  propor-
tions  property-sharing  to  the duration  of the  marriage  and  excludes  divi-
sion  of  premarital  property,  gifts  and  inheritances  identifiable  as  such;
(3) it  discourages,  to  a  great  extent,  that  useless  rehashing  of the  history
of the  marriage  which  is  invited  by  statutory  guidelines  on discretionary
property division;  (4) it has the  merit of serving  as  a  framework  for private
ordering  of  the  financial  aspects  of  divorce  by  enabling  the  spouses  to
know  what  the  likely  result  will  be if their  affairs  are  settled  by  a judge.
Some  Americans  might  react  to  this  notion  the  way  Mark  Twain  once
did  when  he  heard  about  a  new  idea  that  displeased  him:  "It's  un-
American!  It's immoral!  Why,  it's downright  French!"  But Louisianians
have  held  fast  to  the  community  of  acquests  (which  they  received,  not
from  France,  but  from  Spain)  and,  if the  writer  is  not  mistaken,  they
have  been  served  well  by  it.
If a  random  sample  of  American  men  and  women  were  asked  what
system  they favored  for settling  property disputes  on  divorce  in the absence
of children,  it is doubtful  that any significant  number  would  want to give
a  lower  court  judge  carte  blanche to  rearrange  their  affairs  in  the  way
that  seems  best to  him  or her.  Yet  this is just what  now happens  in  most
American  states.  It  seems more  likely  that the average  couple  would  choose
a  simple  equal  division  of what  they  had  acquired  through  their  respec-
tive  efforts  during the marriage  over the discretion  system  with  its uncer-
tainty  and  its controversy-provoking  guidelines.  In  situations  where  exact
justice  is  unattainable,  most people  understand  and accept pragmatic  rules
like  the  equal  division  of  acquests.
Let us  now  briefly consider the kinds of cases that  would  be left  over
after  application  of  the  "children-first"  principle  in  the  cases  where  it
applies,  and after  equal  division of acquests  where that is  called  for. These
cases  would  include  situations  where  one  spouse  is  left  with  some,  or
perhaps  even  a great  deal  of, individual  property,  or where  there  is  great
disparity  between the  spouses'  income  or earning power.  There would  also
be  cases where  one  spouse  is  not  only in a  weaker  economic  position than
the  other,  but  also  is  disabled  or  otherwise  in  need,  unrelated  to  child-
raising.  Here  it  seems  that  the  beginning  of wisdom  is  to  identify  these
problems  for  what  they  are.  What  is  at  stake  is  mainly  the  allocation
235-36,  266  (1977);  Rheinstein,  Division  of Marital  Property,  12  Willamette  L.J.  413,  434-35
(1976);  see  also  Stone,  The  Law  Commission:  Third  Report  on  Family  Property:  The
Matrimonial  Home  (Co-Ownership  and  Occupation  Rights)  and  Household  Goods.  (Law
Com.  No.  86),  42  Mod.  L.  Rev.  192,  198  (1979).
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of  costs  between  the  public  and  private  sectors.  No  principle  seems  as
compelling in these  cases as the "children-first"  principle does  in the cases
to  which  it  applies.  Thus,  different  legislatures  may  well  come  to  dif-
ferent  conclusions  about  whether  the  ex-spouse  or  the  taxpayer  should
pay  in  such  cases.
The  framework  that  has  been  presented  here  is  in  the  nature  of  an
architectural  sketch  without  detailed  specifications.  The  writer  does  not
pretend  that the instrumentation  of this design  would be simple.  Nor  would
its  implementation  completely  solve  another  major  family  law  problem
of  the  1980's:  continuing  financial  provision  for  children  after  divorce
(child  support).  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  family  law  reform  in the  1980's
will  address  the  problem  of child  support  by  being  more  realistic  about
what  it  costs  to  raise  children  and  by utilizing  better  methods of  collec-
tion  and  enforcement-such  as  direct  deduction  from  the  provider's
paycheck.  Here  we  have  much  to  learn  from  Sweden.  This  supposedly
socialist  welfare  state,  while  assuring  decent  subsistence from  public  funds
to  all  families with children,  has  never wavered  in putting primary respon-
sibility for  child support  where it belongs-on  the  parents.30  Sweden's  sup-
port  enforcement  procedures  are  among  the most  efficient  in the  world.
At  this  juncture,  one  may  wonder  whether  a  possible  drawback  in
making the welfare of minor children  the central  issue in  cases  where they
are  present  will  encourage  more  of that  particularly  destructive  form  of
litigation  in which  one  spouse  puts, or threatens to  put,  the other's  fitness
for  custody  in issue  in order  to  prevail  in  financial  matters.  The Califor-
nia  experience,  as  reported  by  Weitzman  and  Dixon,  is  encouraging  on
this  point.  In that  state,  no-fault  divorce  did  not,  as  many  had  feared,
lead  to an increase  in custody litigation  for leverage  in  financial  matters.3'
Ideally,  of course,  both the  "children-first"  principle  and the equal  divi-
sion  of  acquests  rule  should  be  implemented  in  connection  with,  and  in
turn  should  aid  the  functioning  of,  non-adversarial  divorce  procedures.
It  is  encouraging  that  the  idea  of  giving  priority  to  the  interests  of
children  in  cases  where  they  are  involved  seems  to  be  acquiring  a  certain
momentum,  which  may  someday  lead  to  a  complete  reconceptualization
of the  field  of marital  property  law  and  its  reorganization  into  an  area
that  might  better  be  called  family  property  law.32  In  England,  a  new
30.  A.  Agell,  Paying  of  Maintenance  in  Sweden,  4-7,  10-19,  22-23  (1983).
31.  Weitzman  & Dixon,  Child  Custody  Awards:  Legal  Standards and  Empirical  Pat-
terns  for  Child  Custody,  Support  and  Visitation  After  Divorce,  12  U.C.D.  L.  Rev.  471,
490  (1979).
32.  The English  family  law  scholar,  John Eekelaar  of Pembroke  College,  Oxford,  has
urged  that  a  "fundamental  distinction  should  be  made  . . . between  marriages  in  which
children  have  been  reared  and  childless  marriages,"  and  has also  endorsed  the notion  that
equal division  of acquests  may  be the  most appropriate  principle  for  winding  up  the  prop-
erty  aspects  of  childless  marriages.  J.  Eekelaar,  Family  Law  and  Social  Policy,  121  (2d
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matrimonial  and  family proceedings  bill  which  is currently  making its way
through  Parliament  retains  the  system  of  discretionary  distribution,  but
would amend  the guidelines  to require judges  to give priority to the  welfare
of children.33  If adopted,  depending  on  how English  judges  interpret and
apply it,  this new provision could  transform  English  property division and
support  law.  As public  awareness  spreads  of the  extent  of the child  sup-
port  problem  in  the  United  States  and  of  the precipitous  drop  in  living
standards  experienced  by custodial parents and children  after divorce,  the
need  to  systematically  reformulate  the  law  governing  divorces  involving
children  will  become  increasingly  apparent.  This  will perhaps  provoke  a
long  needed  reappraisal  of  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of parents  in
principle.  An appropriate  place  to start this process  might  be with  a  fun-
damental,  but  half-forgotten,  text  of  modern  liberal  thought.
John  Stuart Mill,  in  his  famous  essay  On Liberty, endeavored  to  set
forth  a  general  principle  by  which  the  legitimacy  of  governmental  in-
terference  with  individual  liberty could  be tested.  That  principle  was  that
"the  only  purpose  for  which  power  can  be  rightfully  exercised  over  any
member  of  a  civilised  community,  against  his  will,  is  to  prevent  harm
to others."3  Less  well-remembered  is Mill's  reasoning  about  why a general
theory  about  liberty  is  necessary  and  why  the  traditional  English  suspi-
cion of governmental  power  is  insufficient  to protect  the individual.  Mill
argued  that,  without  some  such  recognized  general  principle,  liberty  not
only  is  often  withheld  where  it  should  be  granted,  but  is  just  as  often
granted where  it should  be  withheld. 3  His  prime example  of a  misplaced
grant  of  liberty  was  drawn  from  family  relations  concerning  children.
Observing  that  "[it  is  in  the  case  of  children  that  misapplied  notions
of liberty are  a real  obstacle  to the fulfillment  by the State of its duties," 36
the  great  modern  apostle  of  liberty  stated:
It  still  remains  unrecognised,  that  to  bring  a child  into  existence
without  a  fair  prospect  of  being  able,  not only  to  provide  food
for  its body,  but instruction  and training  for  its mind,  is  a moral
crime,  both  against  the  unfortunate  offspring  and  against  socie-
ty;  and  that if the parent  does not  fulfill  this obligation,  the State
ed.  1984).  In the  United  States,  Professors  Judith  Younger  and Thomas Oldham  have both
been  critical  of the  fact  that  American  law  presently  governs  all  marrriages  and  divorces,
short  or  long,  childless  or  not,  with  a  single  set  of rules.  Younger,  Marital  Regimes:  A
Story  of Compromise  and  Demoralization,  Together  with  Criticism  and  Suggestions  for
Reform,  67  Cornell  L.  Rev.  45  (1981);  Oldham,  Is  the  Concept  of Marital  Property  Out-
dated?,  22  J.  Fam.  L.  263  (1984).
33.  Maidment,  Family  Law  Practitioner,  133  New  L.J.  1053-54  (1983).
34.  J. Mill,  On Liberty,  in Utilitarianism,  Liberty,  and  Representative  Government  81,
95-96  (1951)  (1st  ed.  1859).
35.  Id.  at  95,  215.
36.  Id.  at  215.
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ought  to  see  it  fulfilled,  at  the charge,  as  far as  possible,  of the
parent.37
Mill  is  well-known  for  having  contended  that  laws  making  divorce  dif-
ficult to obtain  were  an impermissible  interference  with  individual  freedom,
but  it  is  likely  that  he would  be  astonished  if he  could  see the  ease  with
which  spouses  today  can divorce  not only  each  other but,  de facto, their
children.  To  him it  was  evident  that  "[tihe  fact  itself,  of  causing the  ex-
istence  of  a  human  being,  is  one  of the  most  responsible  actions  in  the
range  of  human  life." 38  He  deplored  "current  ideas  of  liberty,  which
• . . would  repel  the  attempt  to  put  any  restraint  upon  [a  parent's]  in-
clinations  when  the consequence  of  their  indulgence  is  a  life  or  lives  of
wretchedness  and depravity  to the offspring,  with manifold  evils  to those
sufficiently  within  reach  to  be  in  any  way  affected  by  their  actions." 39
To  sum  up thus  far,  the writer  has  argued  that  family  property  and
family support  law  is today  in  need  of  a  basic  reorientation  in principle.
Once  that  is  accomplished,  a  wide  array of  techniques  for  its  implemen-
tation are  available  for the legislator to choose  from. But  what must come
first  is  a  change  of  mind  and  heart.  We  must  stop  using  an  idea  of
"marital"  property  to  sweep  the  problems  of children  in  divorce  under
the rug.  We  must  not  let misplaced  notions of individual  liberty interfere
with  the  development  of  efficient  child  support  collection  and  enforce-
ment programs.  And  we  must commit ourselves  to the notion that  having
children  engages  one's  responsibility  irrevocably.
PRIVATE  ORDERING  OF  MARITAL  PROPERTY  UPON  DIVORCE
Let  us now  turn briefly to  a related area  where law reform  is  urgently
needed  in  most  American  states:  regulation  of  the  economic  aspects  of
marriage by  contract  entered  into  prior to,  or sometimes  during,  marriage.
As  civil-law  countries  have  long  recognized,  no  single  set  of  legal  rules
for  the  distribution  of property  upon  divorce  or  death  will  be  suitable
for the situation  of each and  every married  couple.  Not only do  different
couples have  different needs  and desires,  but the  requirements  of the  same
couple  with  respect  to  their  economic  relationship  may  change  over  the
course  of  their  marriage.  Furthermore,  as  all  legal  systems  acknowledge
to  some extent,  in the case  of couples with  dependent children  the freedom
of contract  of the spouses  has  to  be  subordinated  to  the  need  to provide
adequately  for  the  children.
In  most  civil-law  jurisdictions,  the  marriage  contract  is  a  well
established  institution  whose  legal  status is relatively  clear."'  In the United
37.  Id.  at  216.
38.  Id.  at  220.
39.  Id.
40.  For  a  comparative  survey  of contractual  regulation  of marital  property  relations,
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States,  however,  marriage  contracts  (except  for separation  agreements)  have
not  been  widely  used,  and  American  law  traditionally  has  done  little  to
facilitate  them.  Indeed,  until  quite  recently,  the  law  of  most  states  was
hostile  to  agreements  which  attempted  to  provide  in  advance  of separa-
tion  for  the  economic  consequences  of  divorce,  more  hostile  than  with
respect  to  agreements  relating  to  property  distribution  upon  death.'
Now  it  is  clearly  time  for  a  change.  We  need  a  workable  legal
framework  for contracts  entered  into prior and during  marriage to regulate
financial  matters  between  the  spouses.  One  of  the  most  significant
demographic  developments  of  the  latter  part  of  the  twentieth  century  is
the  increasing  proportion  of  older  people  in  the  population.  Greater
longevity,  together  with  the frequency  of divorce  and  remarriage,  creates
a  significant  and  legitimate  demand  for  a  type  of  financial  planning  by
spouses  that  Americans  used  to  consider  unromantic.  Unfortunately,  the
law of the various  states on this  subject  is  currently  in disarray.  Substan-
tial  differences  exist  among  the states  in the  legal  treatment  accorded  to
contracts  between  spouses  or  prospective  spouses.  This  fact  in  itself  is
a  serious  drawback  to the  use  of such  contracts,  given our  highly mobile
population.  In  addition,  within  a  single  state  there  are  apt  to  be  incon-
sistencies  among general  contract law,  law pertaining  to contracts  between
spouses,  divorce  law,  and succession  law  concerning  the tests  for and limits
on  the validity  of agreements  attempting  to control  the economic  aspects
of divorce  or the  distribution of property  on death.  Furthermore,  although
state  after  state  is  now  abandoning  older  decisions  that  held  antenuptial
contracts  looking  toward divorce  unenforceable  in  principle,  there  is  now,
with  respect  to any given  contract,  an unacceptably  high  degree  of doubt
about  the  extent  to  which  it  will  in  fact  be  enforced. 2  These  problems
were  recognized  in  the  draftsmen's  prefatory  note  to  the  1983  Uniform
Premarital Agreements  Act  which states  that at present  "there  is  a substan-
tial uncertainty  as  to the  enforceability  of all,  or  a  portion,  of the provi-
sions  of  [premarital]  agreements  and  a  significant  lack  of uniformity  of
treatment  of  these  agreements  among  the  states.""3
As  marriage  contracts  in  view  of  divorce  have  become  enforceable,
courts  have  tended  to  consider  some  or  all  of  the  following  factors  in
deciding  whether  and  to  what  extent  they  will  implement  the  parties'
see  generally  Rheinstein  & Glendon,  supra  note  27,  at  148-65.  See  also  Comment,  The
Enforcement  of Marital  Contracts  in the  United States,  Great  Britain,  France,  and Quebec,
6  B.C.  Int'l  & Comp.  L.  Rev.  475  (1983).
41.  See  generally  Clark,  Antenuptial  Contracts,  50 U.  Colo. L.  Rev.  141  (1979).
42.  See  generally  Note,  Antenuptial  Contracts  Governing  Alimony  or  Property  Rights
upon  Divorce:  Osborne  v.  Osborne,  24  B.C.L.  Rev.  469  (1983).
43.  Unif.  Premarital  Agreements  Act,  Fam.  L.  Rep.  (BNA)  201:0121,  201:0121  (Mar.
13,  1984)  [hereinafter  cited  as U.P.A.A.].  The  U.P.A.A.  does  not cover  postnuptial  or separa-
tion  agreements.
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agreements:  whether  or  not  there was  fair  disclosure of the  extent  of the
parties'  wealth  at the  time of the contract,  whether  the contract  is  "fair,"
"reasonable,"  or  "unconscionable"  (with some courts  seeking  to evaluate
these  qualities  as  they  were  at  the  time  of contracting  and  others  at  the
time of attempted  enforcement);  how the provisions  of the contract  com-
pare  with  the  legal  support  obligations  that  they  would  displace;  and
whether  enforcement  of  the  contract  would  make  one  of  the spouses  a
public charge.1
4  Under  alternative  A  of section  307  of the Uniform  Mar-
riage  and Divorce  Act,  a marriage contract  is just one  factor among  several
that  a  court  is  to  "consider"  in  determining  whether  its  division  of the
spouses'  property  is  equitable. 5
The unhappy  fact is  that the spirit of discretionary  distribution  seeped
into  the  marriage  contract  law  of  the  1970's.  Just  as  no  one  can  now
be  sure  how  a  couple's  property  will  be  distributed  in  a  discretionary
distribution  state,  no  one  can  be  sure  whether  an  antenuptial  agreement
will  hold  up  in  a  divorce  proceeding,  especially  if  a  judge  is  allowed  to
determine  whether  the  agreement  is  "fair"  at  the  time  of  enforcement.
Thus, the  principal  issue in this area  for the  1980's is  not the enforceability,
but  the  problem  of  limits  on  enforceability  of  marriage  contracts.
For  persons  with  a  substantial  amount  of property,  the discretionary
distribution  revolution,  together  with  the uncertain  state of  the  law  con-
cerning  the  enforceability  of  agreements  relating  to  marital  property,  is
a  disaster.  It  has  become  doubtful  whether  and  to  what  extent  inherited
or  premarital  property  can  be  kept  separate  or  in  the  family  line  from
whence  it  came.  Nor  can  one  be  sure to  what  extent the  fruits  of a  long
first  marriage  can  be  secured  for  the  children  of that  marriage  when  a
later  marriage  ends.
Although  the  writer  deplores  the  existing  uncertainty  about  the  en-
forceability  of antenuptial  agreements  upon  divorce,  the  solution  to  this
problem  cannot  be  simply  that  contracts  between  spouses  on  financial
matters should  be enforced  in the  same way as  other contracts-particularly
if one  accepts  the  "children-first"  principle  put  forward  in the  first  part
of this paper.  That principle  would  dictate that we approach  the problem
of contracts  in  divorce  similarly  to  the  way  it  has  been  suggested  above
that  we  approach  the  problem  of  property  allocation  upon  divorce.
First,  we must distinguish  between childless  marriages  and those  marriages
in  which  children  are  present or  have  been  raised.  Without  entering  into
details  here,  it is suggested  that  substantial limitations  on  freedom of con-
tract  in  the  latter  case  are  appropriate,  at  least  if  there  are  dependent
children at the time of divorce.  And,  in  fact,  when one examines  existing
law  and the major law  reform  efforts  relating to contracts  between spouses,
44.  Numerous  illustrations  are  given  in  Clark,  supra  note  41;  Note,  supra  note  42.
45.  U.M.D.A.  §  307,  alternative  A,  9A  U.L.A.  142-43  (1973).
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one  finds  universal  agreement  that  spouses  are  not  completely  at liberty
to  affect  adversely  a  child's  right  to  support.41
The  next  question  of  interest  becomes  whether  there  should  be  any
special limitations  (such  as  disclosure  requirements)  on the  enforceability
of  marriage  contracts  between  persons  whose  marriages  turn  out  to  be
childless.  The  writer's own  view  is that  there should  be  no special  limita-
tions on  such contracts  arising simply  out of the fact  that  the contracting
parties are spouses  or  prospective  spouses.  Even without  such special  limits,
however,  a  significant  degree  of  uncertainty  may  still  shroud  these
agreements if "normal"  contract  rules  are  applied  to  them.  How  will the
rather  open-ended  contract  doctrines  of good  faith,  unconscionability  and
duress be  applied by  the courts  in marital cases?  Since contract law  general-
ly has  become  more  fluid,  making it  easier than ever  for a  party to  avoid
the  consequences  of  an  earlier  bad  bargain,
' 7  matrimonial  lawyers  can
be expected  to seize  on  vague  contract  law  notions  in the  effort to  over-
turn  spouses'  agreements.
Here,  civil-law  techniques  may  offer  a  way  both  to  assure  the  pro-
cedural  regularity  of  the  contractual  formation  process  and  to  provide
an acceptable  degree of certainty  in the enforcement  process.  Assume  for
the  moment  that  the  current  version  of  the  Uniform  Marital  Property
Act (U.M.P.A.)  represents  a  reasonable  substantive  law treatment  of the
problem.  The U.M.P.A.  provides  that spouses  can  agree  before  or during
marriage  with  respect  to  property rights on  death  or divorce,  or modifica-
tion or elimination  of spousal  support,"8  subject to  a requirement  of good
faith, 4 9  and  subject  to  the  rights  of  creditors," 0  bona  fide  purchasers,"
and children  entitled  to support.2  With  respect  to antenuptial  agreements,
the  Act  (deliberately  tracking  the  1983  Uniform  Premarital  Agreements
Act)  provides  that  such  contracts  will  not  be  enforceable  if they  are  not
voluntary  or if they  are  unconscionable  when made  and if the agreement
was  not  accompanied  by  a  fair  disclosure,  and the  spouse  attacking  the
agreement  neither  waived  disclosure  nor  was  on  notice  of  the  extent  of
the other  spouse's  assets. 3 The spouse against  whom  enforcement  is  sought
has  the  burden  of  proof  on  all  these  points."  Where  postmarital
46.  H.  Clark,  The Law of Domestic  Relations  in the United  States 497  (1968);  U.M.D.A.
§§  306(b)  & (f),  307(b),  alternative  A,  9A U.L.A.  135-36,  142-43  (1973);  U.P.A.A.  § 4(b),
Fam.  L.  Rep.  (BNA)  201:0123  (Mar.  13,  1984);  Unif. Marital  Prop.  Act § 10(b),  9A U.L.A.
35  (Supp.  1983)  [hereinafter  cited  as  U.M.P.A.].
47.  G.  Gilmore,  The  Death  of  Contract  80-83  (1974).
48.  U.M.P.A.  §§  3,  10(c)(3)-(4),  9A  U.L.A.  26,  35  (Supp.  1983).
49.  Id.  §  2,  at  26.
50.  Id.  §  8(e),  at  33.
51.  Id.  §  9(c),  at  35.
52.  Id.  §  10(b).
53.  Id.  § 10(g),  at  36;  cf. U.P.A.A.  § 6,  Fam.  L.  Rep.  (BNA)  201:0124  (Mar.  13,  1984).
54.  U.M.P.A.  §  10(f),  9A  U.L.A.  36  (Supp.  1983).
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agreements  are  concerned,  the U.M.P.A.  imposes  a  higher  standard:  an
agreement  unconscionable  when made  will  not be  enforced."  Finally,  the
U.M.P.A.  provides  that  if  the  contractual  provisions  on  support  would
render  one  spouse  eligible  for  public  assistance,  the  court  may  require
the  other  spouse  to  pay  enough  support  to  avoid  such  eligibility.
Let  us take  these  provisions  as  one reasonable  solution  of the  prob-
lem.  What can  a spouse endeavoring  to limit  economic  exposure  in divorce
do  to  minimize the  chances  that  a contract  governed  by this or  a similar
statute  will  be  held  unenforceable  because  of  duress,  unconscionability
or  violation  of  the  good  faith  obligation?
Theoretically,  independent  representation  of both spouses  is  advisable.
The  risks  for  the relationship  of  the parties  from  lawyers'  exerting  their
best  efforts  on  behalf of  their  clients  in  this  situation  are,  however,  not
negligible.  In  civil-law  countries,  of course,  this  problem  is  nicely  handled
by  execution  of the  contract  before  a  civil-law  notary  who  advises  both
parties  and  whose  authentication  lends  great  evidentiary  weight  to  the
instrument. 6  The common requirement  of judicial  approval  of any change
in  the  contract  further  promotes  the  widespread  confidence  in  civil-law
countries  that  such  agreements  will  be  enforced  as  written.  Although  the
notary  (in the  civil  law  sense)  does  not  exist  in  American  common-law
jurisdictions,  it  is  interesting  to  note  a  few  recent  statutory  attempts  to
achieve  for marriage contracts  something  like the effect  of execution  before
a  civil-law notary.  New York,  for  example,  provided in  1980  that marital
property  agreements  would  be valid  and enforceable  if acknowledged  and
proved  in  the  manner  required  for  a  deed  to  be  recorded. 7  Minnesota
has  a  law,  adopted  in  1979,  which  provides  that antenuptial  agreements
are  enforceable  if there  has  been  disclosure of  assets  and  opportunity  to
consult  counsel,  and  if  the  agreement  is  executed  before  two  witnesses
and  acknowledged. 8
Perhaps  some more  progress  along these  lines could  be made by taking
a  leaf from  probate  law.  Most questions  about the enforceability  of mar-
riage  contracts  involve  the circumstances  at  the time  of execution.  Thus,
55.  Id.  §  10(i).
56.  For  the  role  of the  civil-law  notary,  see  generally  N.  Horn,  H.  K6tz &  H.  Leser,
German  Private  and  Commercial  Law:  An  Introduction  44  (T.  Weir  trans.  1982);  Brown,
The Office  of the  Notary  in France,  2  Int'l  & Comp.  L.Q.  60  (1953);  On how  the  notarial
office  survived and  was  transformed  in  Louisiana,  see Burke  & Fox, The  Notaire in  North
America:  A  Short  Study  of the  Adaptation  of  a  Civil  Law  Institution,  50  Tul.  L.  Rev.
318  (1976).
57.  N.Y.  Dom.  Rel.  Law  § 236(B)(3)  (McKinney  Supp.  1983).  The  statute  is a  litiga-
tion  breeder,  however,  in  its  requirement  that  terms  governing  support,  as  distinct  from
property  division,  must  be  "fair  and  reasonable"  when  entered  and  "not  unconscionable
at  the  time  of  entry  of  final  judgment."  Id.
58.  Minn.  Stat. Ann.  § 519.11  (West Supp.  1983).  The statute  expressly permits spouses
to  bar  each  other  from  participating  in  "non-marital"  property.
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the  best time  to  establish such  things  as  voluntariness  and  disclosure  will
also  be  at the  time of execution,  and  not years  later  when memories  have
failed,  one  party  is  dead,  or  both  parties  are  engaged  in  bitter  marital
strife.  To  resolve  the analogous  problem  when a  testator  wishes  to  head
off  a  will  contest,  a  few  American  states,  borrowing  from  the  civil  law,
have  made  available  the  authenticated  (or,  as  it  is  known  in Louisiana,
the  nuncupative)  will,  which  is  very  difficult  for  contestants  to  set  aside
after  the  death  of  the  testator  because  of  the  formalities  used  to  assure
regularity  at  the  time  of  execution."  An  optional  system  of  heightened
procedural  requirements  and  formalities  for  execution  of  marriage  con-
tracts  (along  the  lines  of the procedure  for  authenticated  wills)  would  be
feasible  and  useful  under  modern  American  conditions.
Louisiana  is  well-situated  to lead  the  way  toward a  rational American
marriage  contract  law.  Contractual  regulation  of  marital  property  rela-
tions  is  already  recognized  in  the  Civil  Code  as  normal  and  legitimate,6"
and  a statutory  procedure  for authentication  of wills is  already in  place.6
Thus,  more  than  other  states,  Louisiana  is  in  a  position,  if  it  desires,
to  develop  devices  which  could  promote  the  reliability  of  marriage  con-
tracts  by  establishing  high  quality  evidence  of  their  validity  at  the  time
of  execution.
PROTECTION  OF  FAMILY  MEMBERS  AGAINST  DISINHERITANCE
Thus  far,  this  paper  has  discussed  the  problem  of  the  limits  on  en-
forceability  of marriage  contracts  mainly with  reference  to  the law  of the
forty-nine  common-law  states.  In  Louisiana  and  in  most  civil-law  coun-
tries,  however,  there  is  another  very  significant  limit  on  the  freedom  of
the  spouses to  arrange  their  financial  affairs  by contract,  and that  is  the
prohibition  against  varying  the  order  of  succession.62  Civil-law  systems
typically  protect children of all  ages (and sometimes  ascendants  and other
descendants)  from  disinheritance  by  securing  to  them  a  minimum  share
of the  decedent's  estate  which  cannot  be  defeated  by  will  or inter vivos
transaction. 3  There  has  been  considerable  debate  from  time  to  time  in
Louisiana  over  whether  it  is  necessary  or  desirable  to  retain  the  forced
heirship  provisions  of the Louisiana  Civil  Code,  and,  in  1981,  these  pro-
visions  were  significantly  weakened.64  It  is  true  that  this  peculiarity  of
59.  See  M.  Rheinstein  & M.  Glendon,  The  Law  of Decedents'  Estates  198-99  (1971);
Langbein,  Living  Probate: The Conservatorship  Model,  77 Mich.  L.  Rev.  63,  69-72  (1978),
60.  La.  Civ.  Code  arts.  2328,  2329,  2331,  2336.
61.  La.  Civ.  Code  arts.  1578-1580.
62.  La.  Civ.  Code  art.  880.
63.  See,  e.g.,  La.  Civ.  Code arts.  1493,  1494,  1497;  see  also  M.  Glendon,  supra  note
29,  at  284-88.
64.  See,  e.g.,  Leman,  In  Defense  of Forced  Heirship,  52  Tul.  L.  Rev.  20  (1977);  Le
Van,  Alternatives  to Forced  Heirship,  52  Tul.  L.  Rev.  29  (1977);  Nathan,  An  Assault  on
the Citadel:  A Rejection  of Forced  Heirship,  52 Tul.  L.  Rev.  5 (1977).  Among other  changes
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Louisiana  law  is inconsistent  with the law of other American states where
only  the  surviving  spouse  benefits  from  the  major  protective  devices  of
succession  law.  As  older  people  with  grown  children  increasingly  enter
second  or third  marriages  for companionship,  however,  the question  arises
whether  the time has  come  for common-law  states  to reexamine  their  law
which  leaves  a  testator  free  to  disinherit  his  children  in  all  cases.
At  the  same  time,  the  moment  seems  opportune  to  reconsider  the
forced  share  for spouses  which  is  presently  found in  the law of most states.
If  the  forced  share  was  ever  needed,  it  was  in  the  situation  where  one
spouse  held  title  to  all  the  assets  and  the  other  spouse  had  no  income
or property,  as  frequently  was the  case  in  housewife  marriages  under  the
old  separate  property  system.  Most  community  property  systems  do  not
have  the institution  of the  forced share  for spouses  because equal coowner-
ship  of  the community  funds  means  that  upon  the  death  of  one  spouse
the community  is divided:  one half belonging to the  survivor  and the other
half  forming  part  of  the  estate  of  the  decedent  (upon  which  the  forced
share  for children  is  calculated).  To  put this another  way,  the equal  divi-
sion  of  acquests  in  traditional  community  property  systems  was  a  func-
tional  substitute  for  the  forced  share  in  separate  property  systems  and
vice  versa.  Now  that  the  traditional  separate  property  system  has  been
displaced  by discretionary  distribution  laws  upon  divorce,  and  would  be
displaced  generally  by the presumption  of equal  coownership  of all  marital
property  contained  in the proposed Uniform  Marital  Property  Act,65  the
law of decedents'  estates  is  inevitably affected."  As  the common-law  states
move  by statutory or case  law developments  toward  a situation  where the
spouses  are  treated as coowners  of at least  the  property they acquire  during
the  marriage (and where  as under  the U.M.P.A.  all property of the  spouses
would  be  initially presumed  to be owned  equally), 7  the  need for  a  forced
share  for spouses  is  far from  self-evident.68  This  is  yet another area  where
law  reformers  in common  law  jurisdictions  may,  if they  choose,  benefit
made  by  a  1981  amendment,  the  forced  share  of one  child  was  reduced  from  a  third  to'
a  quarter  of the  parent's  estate.  La.  Civ.  Code  art.  1493.
65.  U.M.P.A.  §  4(c),  9A  U.L.A.  27  (Supp.  1983).
66.  See  Volkmer,  Spousal  Property  Rights  at  Death:  Re-Evaluation  of the  Common
Law  Premises  in  Light  of the  Proposed  Uniform  Marital  Property  Act,  17  Creighton  L.
Rev.  95  (1983)  (pointing  out  the  growing  incoherence  of state  law  relating  to  the  rights
of a surviving spouse in  the light of recent  changes  in the roles of women and  developments
in  marital  property  law).
67.  U.M.P.A.  § 4(b),  9A  U.L.A.  27  (Supp.  1983).
68.  Forced  heirship  for the  surviving  spouse  is  criticized  by  John  H.  Langbein  of the
University  of Chicago  Law  School in  a forthcoming  paper  in  which he  advocates  a  "time-
served"  approach  that would vary the property  rights of the  surviving spouse  with the duration
of the  marriage  on  the  theory  that duration  is  the  best  mechanical  proxy  for  the  relevant
variables  of  need,  contribution,  conduct,  and  desert.  See  also  Volkmer,  supra  note  66,  at
152  (arguing  that  the  coownership  feature  of U.M.P.A.  § 4,  9A  U.L.A.  27  (Supp.  1983),
was meant  "to  totally replace  existing  forced  share  legislation  in  the  common  law  states").
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from  comparative  studies.  But as the question  of the rights  of the surviv-
ing spouse  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper,  let  us  put  it  aside  on this
occasion  in order to  return  to  the situation  of children  in  succession  law.
A recent  American  Bar Foundation study  sheds  some interesting  light
on  the  extent  to  which  existing  succession  law  in  both  community  and
non-community  property states  reflects  the current  testamentary  preferences
of most Americans.
69  While  a narrow  majority of the persons interviewed
stated that they  wanted their entire estates  to  pass to their surviving  spouse
in the situation  where  both  spouse and  children of the marriage survived,
a  very  substantial  minority  wanted  their  estates  to  be  divided  between
spouse and children  in that situation.7"  The research  supported the results
of  earlier  studies  which  had  identified  the  case  where  children  from  a
previous marriage  and a current spouse survive  as an  especially troublesome
one.'  This  special  case  can  be  expected  to  be  increasingly  important.
It  is  therefore  time  to  begin  to  rethink  the  way  succession  law  operates
in  cases where  children  from a  previous  marriage  are  in competition  with
a  surviving  spouse,  or  with  children  from  a  later  marriage.  Particularly
troublesome  situations  arise when  the surviving  children  are the  offspring
of  a  long  marriage  during  which  most  of  the  decedent's  property  was
acquired  (perhaps  even  by  inheritance  from  the  former  spouse)  and  the
surviving  spouse  was  married  to  the  decedent  for  a  relatively  short  time.
Should  the children  of  the earlier  marriage  be  protected  to  some  extent
against  a  will  or  inter  vivos  arrangements  that  leave  everything  to  their
parent's  companion  in  old  age?
If,  as  is  expected,  this type  of  question  becomes  increasingly  urgent
in  the near  future,  legislators  may  be  tempted,  or  induced,  as  they  were
in  the  case  of  property  division  upon  divorce,  to  turn  the  matter  over
to  the  judiciary  for  resolution  by  the  exercise  of  discretion  in  each  in-
dividual  case."  This  was  the  choice  made  by  England  (following  the
example  of New Zealand)  in  1938." 3 Given  the American  experience  with
discretionary  distribution  on  divorce,  however,  it  would  be  unfortunate
.indeed  if  recourse  to  this  type  of  solution  were  to  turn  the  relatively
smooth-functioning  law  of  decedents'  estates  into  another  field  day  for
matrimonial  lawyers.  If comparative  law  teaches  anything,  it is the  necessity
to  be  aware  of  the  context  of legal  rules  and  institutions.  Anyone  who
advocates  the importation  of the English  system of applications  for discre-
tionary  maintenance  or allowances  from a decedent's  estate  by disappointed
69.  Fellows,  Simon  & Rau,  Public Attitudes  About Property Distribution  at  Death and
Intestate  Succession  Laws  in  the  United  States,  1978  Am.  B. Found.  Research  J.  319.
70.  Id.  at  359.
71.  Id.  at  364-70.
72.  Suggestions  to  this  effect  appear  in  the  literature  from  time  to  time.  See,  e.g.,
Gaubatz,  Notes  Toward  a  Truly  Modern  Wills  Act,  31  U.  Miami  L.  Rev.  497  (1977).
73.  M.  Glendon,  supra  note  29,  at  280-82.
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.relatives  and others  should ponder  very  carefully  the  differences  between
the  English  and  the American  judiciary and  legal  professions,  as  well  as
the  differences  in  their  law  of  civil  procedure.  A  legal  device  that  may
operate  in  a  relatively  unobjectionable  manner  in  a  system  like  the
England's  where  most  civil  disputes  are  tried  without  a  jury,  where
discovery  is  restricted,  and  where  the  expenses  of litigation  are  borne  by
the losing  party,  can  and probably  would turn  into  a  source of expensive
and  bitter  litigation  in  the  United  States.
As  with  property  division  upon  divorce,  the  alternative  to  a  system
of  judicial  discretion  is  some  system  of  fixed  rules.  The  latter  has
characterized  the traditional  approach  of the  civil  law  systems  and  Loui-
siana  to  the protection  of children  against  disinheritance.  It  may  be  too
soon  for  the  common-law  states to  accept  the  idea of a  forced  share  for
children  as  a  way  of  dealing  with  problems  generated  by  the  formation
of  successive  families,7"  but  certainly  Louisiana,  which  already  has  the
forced  heirship  institution,  should  think  long  and  hard  before  giving  it
up  or  further  impairing  it just  as  it  seems  to  be  responsive  to  a  newly
emerging  and  important  social  need.
CONCLUSION
This  paper  has  ranged  over  three  loosely  related subjects  that  at  pre-
sent  are  not handled  well  in American  law: division  of property on divorce,
marriage  contracts,  and protection  of children  against  disinheritance.  What
ties  these  three  topics  together,  however,  is  that  a  proper  resolution  of
the  legal  problems  of the  1980's  in  each  area  depends  upon  a  long over-
due  reconsideration  of  the  economic  rights  of  children.  The  danger  in
each  area  is  that  legislatures  and  law  reformers  have  been  all  too  ready
to  see  relatively  unfettered judicial  discretion  as  a  quick  fix.  The  reason
the  writer  chose  to  address  these  three  subjects  in  connection  with  the
Family  Law  Colloquium  is  that,  with  respect  to  each  one,  Louisiana
already  possesses  a  legal  device  which  holds  special promise  for  resolving
contemporary  problems:  the principle  of  equal  division  of  acquests,  the
existing legal  framework  for  the treatment  of marriage  contracts,  and  the
institution  of  forced  heirship.  It  is the  writer's  sincere  hope  that,  as  law
reform  in  this state  proceeds,  the  modern  advantages  of  these  venerable
institutions  of  the  civil  law  will  be  held  firmly  in  view.
74.  One writer has recently  suggested that the common-law  states  should consider follow-
ing Louisiana's  example,  however.  See  Haskell, Restraints  upon  the Disinheritance of Family
Members,  in  Death,  Taxes  and  Family  Property  105,  114-15  (E. Halbach  ed.  1977).
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